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Patrick Connor's War: The 1865 Powder River
Indian Expedition. By David E. Wagner. Norman,
OK: Arthur H. Clark Co., 2010. 296 pp. Maps,
illustrations, appendices, bibliography, index.
$39.95.

Patrick Connor's War is the late David E.
Wagner's second book in the past year dealing
with the military operations against Lakotas
and Cheyennes in the Powder River country
of today's Wyoming and environs in 1865. Like
his previous work, Powder River Odyssey, dealing with Nelson Cole's wing of an expensive
army offensive operation against the Plains
tribes in the wake, some contend, of raids on
the Overland Trail avenging the Sand Creek
Massacre, the current book relies heavily on
campaign records, personal recollections, and
diaries of the officers, civilian contractors,
and enlisted men involved in the campaign.
The volume is rich in detail and likely the
most complete composite synthesis of these
campaign records kept largely by men of state
volunteer regiments. The book includes many
maps that are easy to follow once one realizes the campaign traveled up and down river
and stream courses rather than along modern
roads.
The Connor campaign was basically a logistical disaster in country largely tierra incognita
to the U.S. Army. Food was often scarce; by
late fall the army had lost hundreds of horses
to storms and cold, and many soldiers were on
foot. Those corn-fed army horses that remained
were near starvation by September and never
had been a match for the swift grass-fed Indian
ponies. Occasionally the soldiers had to trade
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for provisions with the very Indians they were
fighting. The columns did inflict casualties on
an Arapaho village in September near modern
Ranchester, Wyoming. Some sources contend
these particular Arapahos were living with
peaceful intent, although some of them may
have participated in prior raids.
The campaign cost millions of dollars, generally was a failure in subduing the Lakotas and
Cheyennes, and reached the level of a scandal
in Washington among Democrats. The offensive actually served to embolden the Plains
Indians' beliefs that they were invulnerable
and, by using their harsh homeland environment to their advantage, could withstand any
and all invasions of the Powder River country
in the future. Essentially, Connor was fighting long-range logistical and communication
problems in the days before railroads, along
with the harsh, dry, storm-prone topography
of the Northern Plains, more than he was the
Indians.
Although Wagner offers conclusions regarding the failure of the Connor expedition, the
book could have been strengthened through
an analysis of the political results as well as
the logistical. By 1866, with the Civil War
ended, volunteer units were being mustered
out of service, leaving a much reduced regular army more concerned with administering
the military Reconstruction districts in the
southern states than having a large presence
on the western frontier. Congress put the nix
on any more large offensive campaigns on the
Northern Plains until the next decade. As a
result, the military presence in the Powder
River country in the next few years was scanty,
operated sporadically from new permanent
forts, and further emboldened the Lakotas
and Cheyennes during Red Cloud's War
(1866-1868) and Hancock's War (1867). The
upshot was the Treaty of 1868 and the Treaties
of Medicine Lodge, which had far-reaching
effects on Indian policy and Indian nations as
the Federal government attempted to win in
peace through these treaties what it could not
win in war. The result of that, of course, was
the so-called Great Sioux War of 1876-1877.
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Although Wagner's treatise suffers from
the lack of Indian perspectives and little use
of Indian sources, for military buffs the book
does serve as a good day-by-day journalistic
narrative of the movements and operations of
the army side of the campaign following the
conclusion of the Civil War.
JOHN H. MONNETT
Department of History
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